September was a rocky month for Vladimir Putin, the Russian strongman used to getting his way after more than two decades at the top of Russia’s political hierarchy.

First came a tactical embarrassment of monumental proportions, when Russian forces lost more than 1,000 square miles of territory south of Kharkiv, Ukraine, in a manner of days — exposing the Russian army’s slapdash nature for the umpteenth time. Then came the diplomatic finger-wagging from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who used a public appearance with Putin on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit to urge him toward dialogue. A day earlier, Putin himself acknowledged that China, which Moscow increasingly depends on for political and economic support, had “questions and concerns” about how the war was proceeding.

Putin’s mobilization of 300,000 reservists, a decision he avoided for nearly eight months, sparked the most vocal acts of opposition from the Russian public since the war began. Protests cropped up in dozens of cities and towns across the country. Terrified at the idea of risking their lives for a mystifying cause, men eligible for the draft rushed to airports, bus depots and train stations; at least 200,000 Russians have fled the country since the Kremlin’s order was announced. Russian business leaders are so concerned about the loss of able-bodied workers that they are asking the Russian government to exempt those with specialized skills.

Putin is therefore desperate for anything he can call a win. His highly manufactured signing ceremony on Friday at the Grand Kremlin Palace, where he approved the incorporation of four Ukrainian regions — Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia — into the Russian Federation, was meant to serve that purpose.

Nobody on the planet, save outcasts such as North Korea and Syria, are buying into it.

Putin has essentially declared victory over swaths of Ukraine he doesn’t control — and the Ukrainians have no intent of giving it to him. By seeking to create a victory out of the jaws of defeat, Putin has just created another problem for the depleted and underresourced Russian military, which will now be expected, at a minimum, to capture every inch of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Anything less would be another blunder for Putin and his war effort, not to mention more evidence of Russia’s numerous military shortcomings.

The annexation is significant for another reason: It puts the kibosh on end-of-war diplomacy between Kyiv and Moscow. True, there wasn’t much diplomacy to begin with. Both sides believe it’s in their interest to keep fighting for their own distinct reasons. For Ukraine, it’s about not wanting to legitimize the seizure of territory by the Russians or offer them a much-needed freeze in the conflict, which Moscow would use to rest and rearm for future offensives. For Russia, it’s partly about preventing a scenario in which the original war objectives have to be downsized, a tacit admission of failure. Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy are in many ways conducting the same strategy: Bide your time and outlast the other until exhaustion sets in.

Last week’s events, however, change the game. If the prospects of a negotiation were infinitesimal last week, they are practically impossible today. Zelenskyy said as much before and after the faux referendums were conducted: If Putin annexes anything, talks are a worthless exercise.

This is troubling news for those around the world who want the war to end as soon as possible.

But our feelings are irrelevant. The only two people who can end the fighting don’t want to.

Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune. © 2022 Chicago Tribune. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency.